The Interplay of Equity and Gender Ideology in Perceived Housework Fairness. Evidence from an Experimental Vignette Design by Carriero, Renzo & Todesco, Lorenzo
	

      !	 
"# 
 
 
--- 		
	 
 	 
 
 
 
 $%&-'%&( 

	



	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Interplay of Equity and Gender Ideology in 
Perceived Housework Fairness. Evidence from an 
Experimental Vignette Design 
 
 
 
Renzo Carriero, Dipartimento di Culture, Politica e Società, 
Università di Torino 
 
Lorenzo Todesco, Dipartimento di Culture, Politica e Società, 
Università di Torino 
 
Il working paper riflette il testo originale presentato dagli autori nel seminario 
del 01/07/2015 organizzato dall’Osservatorio MU.S.I.C. (discussant Roberto 
Albano - Università di Torino, Chiara Bertone - Università del Piemonte 
Orientale, Raffaella Ferrero Camoletto - Università di Torino) 
 
Per la grafica della copertina si ringrazia Federica Turco 
 
Osservatorio sul Mutamento Sociale e Innovazione  
Culturale (MU.S.I.C.) 
Dipartimento di Culture, Politica e Società 
Lungo Dora Siena 100 - 10153 Torino 
mail: osservatorio.music@unito.it 
telefono: 011 6702628 
 
 
 
 1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Previous studies on the perceived fairness of the division of housework have suffered from 
limitations resulting from the use of observational data, namely reverse causation and the 
difficulty of disentangling the effects of strongly interconnected factors. This article 
overcomes these limitations by using an innovative method in this research field: a survey-
based vignette design combining the benefits of experiments with a higher capability of 
generalization. From our findings based on Italian primary data, we argue that both equity 
and gender ideology theories concur to explain housework fairness. Consistently with 
equity theory, under certain conditions it is considered fair to exchange paid and unpaid 
time, regardless of their economic value. Moreover, a request to renegotiate housework is 
more legitimate if it redresses a prior inequity and, for women, irrespective of the asker’s 
gender. Gender ideology affects partners’ equity considerations, weighting their 
contribution to paid and unpaid work differently.  
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One of the reasons explaining the persistent gender gap in housework division is that an 
objective inequality is not necessarily perceived to be unfair, and hence a necessary 
ingredient for change is lacking. Nevertheless, research on the determinants of housework 
fairness has often provided inconclusive evidence because of methodological problems 
relating to the use of standard survey data, namely reverse causation and the difficulty of 
disentangling the effects of strongly interconnected factors. Moreover, scholars testing 
equity theory and gender ideology theory – two theoretical explanations frequently applied 
in previous studies – have generally considered these perspectives to be in opposition, 
even if some theoretical arguments suggest that equity and gender ideology actually 
emphasize different elements of the fairness evaluation process. This study aims to 
overcome these limitations by applying a research design that considers these theories 
jointly, rather than in opposition, and by adopting an experimental method, i.e., the 
vignettes, which also permits a good generalization of findings. Thus, we show how equity 
and gender ideology theory can be empirically integrated to explain housework fairness.  
The methodology proposed here is an innovation for the study of housework fairness and, 
even though we put it into practice in an Italian context, it can also be fruitfully replicated in 
other countries.  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Two theoretical frameworks – equity theory and gender ideology theory – have been most 
commonly used in empirical research on the perceived fairness of the division of 
housework. According to equity theory (see, e.g., Walster et al., 1978),  social 
relationships are considered to be fair whenever each individual’s outcomes (i.e., rewards) 
are proportional to his/her inputs (i.e., contributions).  
Couple relationships involve the exchange of a wide range of tangible and intangible 
inputs and outcomes. Focusing on the tangible ones, an example of an exchange affecting 
housework fairness is that between income and time devoted to domestic chores. 
Individuals who contribute less to the household income should perceive less unfairness in 
the division of unpaid work even if they do most of the tasks. According to Lennon and 
Rosenfield (1994), the underlying mechanism is the lowering of expectations that the 
partner who has fewer resources to put into the relationship has about what can be 
obtained in exchange. Another example of exchange is that between time devoted to paid 
and unpaid work: a lopsided division of housework can be considered to be fair if the 
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partner doing less at home compensates for it with longer working hours (DeMaris and 
Longmore, 1996). Nevertheless, this mechanism works only if both partners are involved 
in and agree to the decision about the division of tasks and responsibilities within the 
couple.1 
In sum, equity theorists hold that paid work, unpaid work and income are valuable inputs 
that can be exchanged within the couple in order to obtain an equitable deal. It is important 
to stress that, because of the gender neutrality of this theory, what matters is the 
proportionality between inputs and outcomes, regardless of the kind of inputs each partner 
puts into the exchange.  
Gender ideology theory emphasizes the role of norms, values and identities in shaping 
individual expectations. Gender ideology can be defined as the set of beliefs and attitudes 
about the appropriate roles of men and women in society and the way a person places 
himself/herself and relevant others with regard to work and family roles, normally linked to 
the gender social structure. Couple relationships provide arenas in which this ideology is 
played out, serving to provide an opportunity for the partners to behave in ways that 
validate their identities as masculine and feminine, that is, to display the visible aspects of 
their gender ideologies (Greenstein, 1996b). Berk (1985) maintained that housework is 
one of the cornerstones of the different roles and responsibilities of men and women, 
because it has traditionally been considered typical female work; consequently, it is one of 
the main contexts in which gender membership can be symbolically created by performing 
(or refusing to perform) various domestic tasks (see also, e.g.,  Jackson and Scott, 2002). 
Unlike equity theory, gender ideology theory does not necessarily consider housework as 
an activity to be avoided or exchanged with some other input: on the contrary, it can also 
be a way of expressing love and care, particularly for women. 
According to gender theorists, women who embrace a traditional gender ideology are 
more prone to consider the management of housework as an integral part of the proper 
female identity. Consequently, a disadvantageous housework division is not necessarily 
seen as unfair. On the contrary, women with an egalitarian gender ideology do not 
consider running a household and raising children as the only pillar of their identity; rather, 
they expect a substantial male contribution to the chores for identitary reasons, and they 
are not willing to consider an unequal division of tasks to be fair.  
                                                 
1 In this respect, see also the role of procedural justice in the conceptual framework developed by Major 
(1987) and Thompson (1991). 
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In the empirical research testing equity and gender ideology theories, these perspectives 
have been regarded as competing rather than complementary (see, e.g., Lennon and 
Rosenfield, 1994; Layte, 1998; DeMaris and Longmore, 1996), because of the former’s 
gender blindness and focus on utilitarian behavior, which neglects the role of norms and 
values. However, there are theoretical arguments for thinking otherwise. Moving from the 
theoretical work developed by Major (1987), Thompson (1991) suggested that housework 
fairness be considered more than exchange and equity, since justice is inherently 
gendered.2 Inspired by Thompson’s reasoning, we argue that equity theory emphasizes 
different elements of the fairness evaluation process than gender ideology theory. The 
latter focuses on how beliefs and attitudes toward gender affect the judgment of inequality 
in the division of housework and the meaning of paid an unpaid work itself, but it does not 
categorically rule out that actors may also take into account equity considerations, which 
could simply be weighted differently. For example, even if a woman judges her housework 
contribution according to traditionally gendered standards, this does not mean that she has 
to ignore her partner’s contribution, unless one assumes “culturally doped” actors. She 
might simply overweight her partner’s inputs to unpaid work and underweight her own, 
compared to what an egalitarian-minded woman would do. If this is correct, empirical 
predictions derived from equity theory are not necessarily competing with gender ideology, 
but are complementary. Moreover, gender ideology can function as a sort of “guide” 
helping partners to define an exchange rate for their exchanges of time and money, which 
is necessary to evaluate fairness in terms of the equity principle, given the different nature 
of the inputs. 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
In the last 25 years, a number of studies, mostly conducted in the United States, have 
tested the predictions of the equity and gender ideology theories about housework 
fairness, but the findings were inconclusive.3 The analysis strategy of a first group of 
studies (Baxter and Western, 1998; Sanchez and Kane, 1996; Sanchez, 1994; 
Nordenmark and Nyman, 2003; Lennon and Rosenfield, 1994; Benin and Agostinelli, 
                                                 
2 Thompson implicitly suggested the integration between equity and gender ideology because her proposal 
included some factors (i.e., outcome values, comparison referents and justifications) that take into account, 
among other things, equity and gender considerations. 
3 These studies usually focused on housework, excluding childcare (for an exception, see Baxter, 2000). A 
few studies (see, e.g., Greenstein, 2009) have adopted a comparative approach to shed light on the macro-
level factors affecting housework fairness. 
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1988; Baxter, 2000; Young et al., 2013; DeMaris and Longmore, 1996) simply consisted in 
testing the main effects on the perception of fairness of the different factors suggested by 
equity and gender ideology theories: time devoted to housework and paid employment, 
income and gender attitudes. One of the first studies (DeMaris and Longmore, 1996) to 
test all these factors on both men and women found that fairness perception increased 
when the husband's relative contribution to housework and paid work increased, in line 
with equity theory; however, income did not affect housework fairness. Moreover, 
egalitarian husbands tended to see the division of housework as more unfair to their wives 
than did traditional husbands, and egalitarian wives saw the division as more unfair to 
themselves, consistently with gender ideology theory. These findings were largely 
confirmed by other studies as regards the effects of housework time and income, but the 
evidence for the effect of paid work time and gender ideology was mixed (for conflicting 
findings see, e.g., Lennon & Rosenfeld 1994 and Sanchez 1994 as regards the former; 
Baxter & Western 1998 and Baxter 2000 as regards the latter). 
Several scholars (Lavee and Katz, 2002; Greenstein, 1996a; Layte, 1998; Blair and 
Johnson, 1992; Piña and Bengston, 1993; Braun et al., 2008; Greenstein, 2009) adopted a 
different analysis strategy, arguing that time devoted to paid work, income and gender 
attitudes shape the perception of fairness in interaction with the actual inequality of 
housework division. These authors’ analyses considered both the main effects and the 
interactions between various equity and gender ideology factors and the actual division of 
housework. According to Braun and colleagues (2008), just analyzing the main effects 
would lead to biased and inconclusive results, because “different groups of women react 
differently to inequality of the household division of labor” (p. 1152). Even this analysis 
strategy, however, resulted in mixed evidence (for instance, Greenstein 1996a and Blair & 
Johnsons 1992 reached different conclusions about the role of gender ideology).  
 
MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY 
 
Considering both the main effects of paid work, income and gender ideology and their 
interactions with housework division was the first important step towards achieving a fuller 
understanding of housework fairness. Nonetheless, it did not solve two important 
methodological problems resulting from the use of observational data, both cross sectional 
and longitudinal, that probably contribute to explaining the inconsistency of the research 
carried out so far. The first problem is a general issue concerning reverse causation in the 
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relationship between attitudes and behaviors. All previous studies assume that the division 
of housework affects the perception of fairness; however, it cannot be ruled out that 
perceived (un)fairness in turn influences the housework time. Consequently, a portion of 
the latter’s effect on the former might be endogenous. Second, analyses based on survey 
data generally cannot disentangle the effects of factors that are strongly interconnected in 
real life (i.e., paid work, unpaid work, and income). It is difficult to infer their effects on 
fairness, even with multivariate techniques, because they are part of complex causal 
chains and are the outcomes of decisions that actors make jointly (i.e., the allocation of 
time to different activities).  In cross-sectional and longitudinal observational designs, only 
the causal effect of one factor can be, at best, estimated, because the others are used as 
control variables, and reverse causation cannot always be ruled out. In a longitudinal 
observational design, it is possible to detect the effects of life course events (e.g., 
parenthood and relationship transitions) that produce changes in the partners’ resources 
provision which in turn affect perceived fairness. Also in this case, however, it is difficult to 
estimate which particular change is responsible for change in fairness perception because 
life course events affect all the factors (paid work, unpaid work, income) at the same time. 
Bearing these problems in mind, our study improves on the research carried out so far in 
three main respects. First, we introduce a methodological innovation with the adoption of 
the vignette technique in a survey-based experimental design, which in our opinion is the 
best strategy (see next section) for addressing the earlier studies’ methodological 
limitations. Vignettes in experimental designs have seldom been used in family research; 
to the best of our knowledge, only one study (Antonides and Kroft, 2005), based on a 
basic application of vignettes, addressed the topic tackled here, but did not test equity or 
gender ideology hypotheses and relied on a small convenience sample.  
Second, with our research design, the factors derived from equity and gender ideology 
theories can be dealt with jointly. This makes it possible to overcome a frequent flaw of 
research practice with observational data. In many studies, key indicators from different 
theories are included in the same statistical model in order to test which one has the 
strongest predictive power. This choice reveals that theoretical frameworks are seen as 
being in perpetual conflict, as if they were engaged in a “race” (King, 1986: 669). We 
devise, instead, a kind of analysis where the factors suggested by different theories do not 
compete with each other, but simply tackle different elements of the same process. 
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Third, previous empirical research considered situations in which the different factors 
suggested by equity and gender ideology theories remain constant within subjects.4 Here, 
however, we also consider a scenario in which one partner in the couple requests that 
housework be renegotiated due to a change in paid work time (see next section). This 
makes it possible to carry out an additional empirical test of the theoretical perspectives 
used here, which gives further solidity to our analysis.   
The hypotheses to be tested in this study are presented in the next section, as they can be 
more readily understood after the vignettes have been described. 
 
METHOD 
 
Our study combined a standard phone survey method with an online questionnaire 
containing vignettes or scenarios administered to the same respondents who were 
interviewed by phone. Vignettes are verbal descriptions of fictitious (but realistic) situations 
to be evaluated by subjects, often, but not necessarily, within an experimental research 
design (Mutz, 2011: , ch. 4; Wallander, 2009; Ganong and Coleman, 2006; Finch, 1987). 
In this kind of design, vignettes contain one or more variable elements called factors (i.e., 
variables deemed to affect an individual’s judgment about the vignette) that are randomly 
assigned to respondents. Random assignment makes it possible to assess the causal 
effect of the factors on people’s judgments. A strength of this method is that, unlike 
laboratory experiments, vignettes can be implemented in a survey in order to generalize 
the findings to a wider population.  
Applying this method to housework fairness is a convenient way to address the 
methodological problems affecting previous research on this topic. Thanks to the 
experimental manipulation of stimuli made possible by the vignettes, the causal direction 
between behaviors (division of housework) and attitudes (perception of fairness) is 
completely unequivocal, since the former are experimentally manipulated (though only 
within a fictitious representation, see the concluding section). Moreover, the manipulation 
and randomization of factors that are usually strongly interconnected (division of 
housework, time devoted to paid work, income) makes these factors fully independent of 
each other and enables  their causal effects to be estimated simultaneously.  
 
                                                 
4 The few longitudinal studies carried out so far (see, e.g., Perales et al., 2015) focused on the effects of 
parenthood and relationship transitions on housework fairness. 
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Sample and research design  
 
Our sample was randomly drawn from the landline telephone directories of four provinces 
of Piemonte, a region in northwestern Italy. We selected dual-earner married or 
cohabitating couples with at least one child under 13 years old. The particular 
circumstances of this target group, characterized by multiple sources of time pressure 
(from work and family responsibilities), made the choice of this sample highly relevant 
because it is among these households that the issue of the perceived fairness of the 
division of housework becomes particularly salient. Generally speaking, the most 
interesting research questions about  housework division mainly regard dual-earner 
couples, in which the inconsistency between the labour market transformations of recent 
decades and domestic behaviour are well represented. Male breadwinner and female 
breadwinner couples are either less interesting or too rare.  
The female employment rate in Piemonte, though higher than the national average, is not 
very different from the north and central areas of the country (Eurostat, 2014: ; see Labor 
Force Survey regional series). Moreover, as we have calculated from the latest Italian time 
use data (2008-09), the division of housework among dual-earner couples in Piemonte, as 
measured by the ratio of women’s to men’s time devoted to domestic chores, is almost 
identical (2.7) to that of other north-central regions (2.8 on average) and different only from 
that of the traditional southern regions (3.9). Accordingly, although our sample is confined 
to four northern provinces, it can be considered fairly representative of Italian households 
in similar family conditions living in most parts of the country. We will discuss implications 
in the concluding section.  
828 married and unmarried couples (1656 individuals, response rate 42%) were 
interviewed by phone between October 2010 and February 2011 using a structured 
questionnaire about the division of domestic and care tasks, perceived fairness, gender 
roles, and paid work. During Spring 2013, individuals were contacted again to collect their 
email address. We were able to reach 1365 individuals from the initial sample (82%), to 
whom the online questionnaire with the vignettes was sent. 770 individuals (56% of the 
email list or 47% of the initial sample) responded to the questionnaire. As can be 
expected, the considerable drop in the number of cases did not occur entirely at random. 
Indeed, actual respondents were positively selected by education, as is often the case with 
all survey modes. For other important characteristics such as gender, housework division 
 9 
 
and gender attitudes, the differences between the initial and final sample were negligible 
(descriptive statistics of both samples are given in Table 1).5  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Unlike the so-called factorial surveys (Wallander, 2009), where subjects are given multiple 
versions of the same vignette, respondents in our study evaluated only a particular version 
of each vignette (between-subject design). The main advantage of this design, given the 
large number of cases, is that the effects of various factors can be tested without the 
sensitization and carryover effects resulting from multiple evaluations of the same vignette 
(Greenwald, 1976). 
 
Variables, vignettes, and hypotheses 
 
In this article, we focus on the vignette evidence and use survey data only to characterize 
respondents in terms of gender, education, gender attitudes and division of domestic 
labor. The latter two variables are crucial for identifying individuals with egalitarian / 
traditional gender ideologies. Gender ideology is usually captured from respondents’ 
answers to attitudinal questions. Accordingly, we created a scale using the respondents’ 
level of agreement (5-point Likert scale) with seven items.6 Respondents were then sorted 
into three groups using tertiles of the scale variable, named egalitarian, transitional and 
traditional, although these labels must be understood as relative to a sample of dual-
earner couples (i.e., less traditional than average). Nevertheless, the reliability value of our 
gender attitude scale (α = 0.62) is under the conventional threshold. So, we complement it 
by including in the analysis a measure of a behavioral consequence of gender ideology, 
that is, the proportional contribution to domestic labor (Davis and Greenstein, 2009). We 
asked respondents to report the frequency of the various domestic activities in their 
                                                 
5 Within the final sample, 74% of respondents form household couples with other respondents and hence are 
not statistically independent units. For this reason, we made robustness checks of all our findings by 
randomly sampling one respondent per couple. We found no substantial differences (results not shown). 
6 The items are: “A woman needs children in order to feel fulfilled”, “It is not good for the couple if the woman 
earns more than the man”, “In case of marital disruption it is better for children to live with the mother rather 
than with the father”, “A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his/her mother has a full-time job”, “When parents 
need care, it is more natural for daughters to perform this task than sons”, “A man needs children in order to 
feel fulfilled”, “A woman should be willing to devote less time to paid work for the sake of the family”. 
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household and then their proportion of participation in each activity.7 We assigned 
conventional numerical values to the frequency and proportion of participation answers in 
order to obtain an index expressing the percentage of housework done by the wife. Once 
again, we sorted our respondents into three groups (egalitarian, collaborative and 
traditional).8 
The online questionnaire contained two vignettes focused specifically on our topic. The 
first dealt with the fairness of a given family arrangement in terms of paid and unpaid work. 
The following is the English translation of the text (factors and associated levels  in 
brackets): 
The Rossi family consists of a husband and wife who both work. (They have no 
children / They have a 2-year-old child). The wife contributes to family income 
by approximately (two-thirds / one half / one-third) and devotes to her job (10 
fewer hours per week than her husband / 10 hours more per week than her 
husband / the same number of hours as her husband).9 At home, chores are 
divided between the spouses as follows: the wife does about (20% / 50% / 
80%) of the housework and the rest is done by the husband. Taking all these 
elements into account, how do you personally judge the division of housework 
in this family? 
Respondents had to judge the fairness of the housework division represented in the 
vignette on a 0-100 scale (0=completely unfair to the husband; 50=fair to both; 
100=completely unfair to the wife). This vignette manipulated the three factors pointed out 
by equity theory, relating to the exchange of time (paid and unpaid work) and money 
inputs in the household. The fourth factor (children in the home) was introduced as a 
control condition that might alter the judgment, given that the presence of young children 
fosters a traditional division of both housework and childcare (see, e.g., Schober, 2013). 
The vignette enabled us to test three hypotheses derived from equity and gender ideology 
theories: 
H1a: According to equity theory, inequality in housework, irrespective of the 
gender of the disadvantaged spouse, is judged to be fair if it is compensated 
with an opposite inequality in paid work time contribution. 
                                                 
7 Childcare activities were excluded because their meanings are rather different from those of the household 
chores (Coltrane, 2000). 
8 The attitudinal and the behavioral measures of gender ideology are not strongly correlated because of the 
low reliability of the former and the fact that behaviors do not necessarily reflect attitudes. 
9 We represented wife’s paid work time contribution with relative hours instead of a ratio (as for income) in 
order to minimize the risk of respondents being confused by different numbers.  
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H1b: According to equity theory, inequality in housework, irrespective of the 
gender of the disadvantaged spouse, is judged to be fair if it is compensated 
with an opposite inequality in income contribution. 
H2: According to gender ideology theory, a division of housework unfavorable 
to the wife is judged more unfair by egalitarian individuals than by traditional-
minded ones. Conversely, a division of housework unfavorable to the husband 
is judged more unfair by traditional-minded individuals than by egalitarian ones. 
The second vignette concerned the justifiability of a request to renegotiate housework 
division, due to an unemployment episode that creates an involuntary imbalance between 
the wife’s (Luisa) and husband’s (Federico) contribution to paid work time (and 
consequently to income, even if the subject receives an unemployment allowance). This 
imbalance occurs within a domestic arrangement that, depending on the manipulation’s 
outcome, can be egalitarian or unequal to his or her advantage. The English translation of 
the text follows (notice that once the character’s gender, i.e., Luisa / Federico, is 
manipulated the first time, then the subsequent text is consequently fixed):  
Luisa and Federico form a family and (do not have children / have a child / have 
two children). Both are full-time employed. At home, Luisa does (most / about 
half / a small part) of the chores and the rest is done by Federico. At one point, 
(Luisa / Federico) is laid off, so (she / he) has much more free time than before. 
(Federico / Luisa) then asks (Luisa / Federico) – given that (she / he) now has 
more available time – to take on the housework that (he / she) previously did. 
Taking all these elements into account, how justified or unjustified is (Federico’s 
/ Luisa’s) request in your opinion?  
Respondents  expressed their opinion on a 1 to 10 scale where 1 = totally unjustified and 
10 = totally justified. In practice, this vignette makes it possible to study the perceived 
legitimacy, and implicitly fairness, of changes in housework that can bring the situation 
closer to or farther from the equity point, depending on the previous division of housework 
and the new occupational status of one of the partners. For example, if the prior domestic 
arrangement was unequal to his advantage, his request for renegotiation following her 
unemployment, should be less justified than if the prior domestic arrangement was 
egalitarian or unequal to her advantage. The manipulation of the gender of the spouse 
who becomes unemployed served to control for the existence of a gendered standard of 
evaluation, as can be hypothesized following the gender ideology perspective. The 
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children factor was introduced for the same reason as in the first vignette. This vignette 
enables us to test the following hypotheses: 
H3: According to equity theory, a request to renegotiate housework is 
considered to be more legitimate if it serves to redress a prior inequity, 
irrespective of the gender of the spouse who asks to renegotiate. 
H4: According to gender ideology theory, the wife’s requests to renegotiate 
housework are at least as justified as the husband’s for egalitarian individuals, 
and less justified for traditional ones. By contrast, traditional individuals view the 
husband’s request to renegotiate housework as more justified than do 
egalitarian ones. 
Given that subjects’ ratings of the vignettes were expressed through numerical scales (0-
100 or 1-10), we analyzed data by means of multiple-factor ANOVAs. As outlined in the 
empirical evidence section, selected interaction effects among the vignette factors were 
included in the analysis. Randomizing factors makes controlling for respondents’ 
characteristics theoretically and practically useless. Some of these characteristics (gender, 
education, attitudinal and behavioral gender ideology) are included as covariates 
interacting with selected vignette factors in order to test specific hypotheses deriving from 
gender ideology theory, or to ascertain possible sources of heterogeneity in average 
experimental effects.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Vignette 1: Fairness evaluation of housework division 
 
Table 2 shows the ANOVA for the vignette concerning the fairness evaluation of the 
division of housework. The following findings are not split by respondent’s gender, 
because this covariate had no main effect and did not interact with any of the vignette’s 
factors (results not shown).  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
In line with the predictions of equity theory, significant effects of the wife’s % of housework 
and wife’s hours of paid work were found (Model 1). Moreover, there was a significant 
interaction between the time inputs, meaning that the effect of housework division on 
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fairness judgment is contingent upon the wife’s involvement in paid work. These findings 
support Hypothesis 1a insofar as fairness can be achieved, not only through a perfectly 
equal distribution of domestic work, but also through an exchange between the latter and 
paid work (Graph 1).  
 
[Graph 1 about here] 
 
Indeed, when the wife works 10 hours more than her husband and does just 20% of the 
housework, the division is considered approximately fair (avg. score = 55, being 50 the 
equity point). Interestingly, the exactly opposite situation (i.e., the wife working outside 
home 10 fewer hours than her husband and doing 80% of housework) was not found fair 
by interviewees, but rather unfair to the wife (avg. score = 34). This asymmetry, which is 
the consequence of the interaction between paid and unpaid work, may represent 
respondents’ unwillingness to reinforce the wife’s traditional home-making role, a model 
that they perhaps do not want to support explicitly, although they still largely conform to it, 
given that women in our sample spend much less time in paid work than men (results not 
shown). The ANOVA table (Model 1) also shows that the effect of the wife’s contribution to 
family income had a significant but very small main effect at conventional levels (p=0.042), 
whereas its interaction with housework was not significant at all. Therefore, Hypothesis 1b 
cannot be strongly supported: although income contribution seems to have a slight effect 
on judgments in the expected direction (when the wife’s contribution changes from one 
third to two thirds, the average fairness score increases from 45 to 47, data not shown), its 
relevance is too weak to permit a real exchange with the partner’s housework to achieve 
equity. Put differently, money (hopefully!) cannot buy fairness, at least in the family.  
Finally, by introducing the effect of the gender ideology covariates and its interaction with 
the vignette’s division of housework (Table 2, Model 2 and 3), we found partial support for 
Hypothesis 2. The attitudinal measure of gender ideology had a significant main effect, but 
no interaction effect. Graph 2 shows that individuals with an egalitarian attitude judge 
domestic inequalities that are unfavorable to the wife more negatively than traditional-
minded ones (the difference is statistically significant, test not shown), whereas the latter, 
contrary to our hypothesis, do not judge domestic inequalities that are unfavorable to the 
husband to be more unfair than egalitarian individuals. The behavioral measure of gender 
ideology yielded a significant interaction effect, suggesting that domestic inequalities are 
viewed more negatively – in either direction, toward the wife or the husband – by 
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individuals with egalitarian behaviors, regardless of the spouse who has been 
disadvantaged (Graph 3). Here again, traditional-minded individuals do not view domestic 
inequalities that are unfavorable to the husband as being more unfair. 
 
[Graph 2 & 3 about here] 
 
We also checked for differential effects of vignette factors across education sub-groups, 
but this individual covariate did not interact with any of the factors (results not shown). 
 
Vignette 2: Renegotiating housework division 
 
Table 3 shows the ANOVA for the vignette concerning the request to renegotiate 
housework division after the partner’s job loss. The findings show that the share of 
housework prior to being laid off and the gender of the spouse who becomes unemployed 
have significant main effects (Model 1). The main effect of gender holds on average, but is 
strongly driven by men’s answers in our sample. This is proved by the significant 
interaction between respondent’s gender and the vignette’s gender (Table 3, Model 2). 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Graph 4 illustrates substantive findings, split by respondent’s gender. Men tend to 
systematically justify the wife’s request more than the husband’s, perhaps because they 
are afraid of appearing as male chauvinists, given the rising importance of equal 
opportunities in Western countries. Nevertheless, the possibility that men are truly more 
sympathetic with the female condition cannot be ruled out. By contrast, fairness scores 
among women do not differ significantly by the vignette’s gender, in line with equity theory 
(we performed statistical tests and separate analyses by respondents’ gender not shown 
here). Another relevant result is that all means are above 6 on a 1-10 scale, meaning that 
the request to renegotiate is considered legitimate enough on average, whatever the 
situation. The unemployment episode creates an imbalance in the paid work contribution 
that, in line with equity theory, can be legitimately compensated by an opposite imbalance 
in housework, whatever the starting point. It can also be seen that, in accordance with our 
Hypothesis 3, the request is more justified if it serves to redress a prior inequity. In both 
women’s and men’s answers, the fairness score is higher when the subject who asks to 
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renegotiate did most of the chores than when he/she did about half of the chores or less. 
In the first case, the prior division of housework was inequitable as it was not 
counterbalanced by a symmetrical inequality in paid work (both spouses were full-time 
employed).  
 
[Graph 4 about here] 
 
Lastly, we found significant interaction effects between the vignette’s gender and 
respondent’s gender ideology variables that partially meet our Hypothesis 4 (see Table 3, 
Model 3 and 4). Here again, however, answers differ between male and female 
respondents (see Graphs 5 and 6). Among men, a systematic over-justification of the 
wife’s request is found again, although it is weaker among traditional-minded husbands. In 
line with our expectations,  traditional women consider the husband’s request slightly more 
justified than the wife’s, whereas for egalitarian ones the contrary is true (we performed 
statistical tests – not shown here – revealing significant differences between egalitarian 
and traditional women in both measures of gender ideology). 
 
[Graph 5 & 6 about here] 
 
As in the first vignette, no significant interaction between any of the factors and 
respondent’s education was found (results not shown). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Previous research testing equity and gender ideology theories often considered these 
perspectives as opposed. However, the factors suggested by these theories seem to 
complement rather than exclude each other. This study showed how they can be 
concretely integrated in empirical research. The first vignette shows that, as suggested by 
the equity theory, paid and unpaid work can be traded in order to reach an equitable deal, 
at least under certain conditions. Nevertheless, gender ideology plays a role in this 
process, above and beyond the compensations that can be offered within the exchange. 
As suggested by Greenstein (1996a), gender ideology works as a lens through which 
inequalities in the input/output exchange are viewed, and thereby turned (or not) into 
inequities: egalitarian individuals are more severe than traditional-minded ones in the 
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evaluation of inequalities disfavoring women. At the micro level, this result mirrors what 
has been found at the macro level: there is less tolerance for gender inequalities in 
domestic work in more egalitarian countries (Greenstein, 2009). 
Additional findings from the second vignette support the contention of an integration 
between equity and gender ideology theories. On the one hand, a request to renegotiate 
housework  due to an unemployment episode for one partner is always considered to be 
legitimate, whatever the previous division of paid and unpaid work. This follows the 
predictions of equity theory: an unemployed person can redress inequity with a partner 
engaged in market activities by carrying out most or all domestic activities. Also in line with 
equity theory, the  request to renegotiate is seen as more legitimate if it compensates for a 
previous imbalance in the division of responsibilities. Moreover, the same legitimacy is 
attributed, at least by women, both to the husband’s and to the wife’s request. 
Nevertheless, the level of legitimacy depends on gender ideology: egalitarian women 
legitimate the wife’s request more than the husband’s, whereas the opposite is found 
among traditional ones. 
By contrast, some findings do not support equity and gender ideology theories. First, the 
exchange that individuals seem to consider fair has a symbolic rather than economic 
foundation, as might be expected in marital relationships, following the logic of what Haas 
and Deseran (1981) called “symbolic exchange” and Hochschild (1989) “economy of 
gratitude.” This can be seen from the fact that income enters in the evaluation of fairness 
of a given domestic arrangement only to a very limited extent. Moreover, the effect of paid 
work time on fairness is independent of its monetary value, as income is exogenous here 
and included in the ANOVA. Thus, time inputs (paid and unpaid work) can be considered 
as bargaining chips, regardless of economic considerations. Another result to be stressed 
is that men systematically over-justify the wife’s request to renegotiate housework, though 
women do not. This is not in line with equity theory, given its gender neutrality, and strictly 
speaking it clashes with gender ideology theory as well: even traditional men see the 
wife’s request as more legitimate than the husband’s, although the opposite was expected. 
This result can be interpreted in two different ways, so the issue remains open for further 
research. The first interpretation suggests the possibility that men, even the traditional 
ones, are slowly becoming aware of the importance of equality in housework division and 
are more sympathetic to the female condition. This interpretation would follow the theory of 
lagged adaptation put forward by Gershuny and colleagues (1994), according to which 
adjustments of responsibility for paid and unpaid work do not occur in the short run, but 
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rather through an extended process of household negotiation over a long period. In Italy, 
we know that the male contribution to housework and especially to childcare is slowly 
changing (see, e.g., Ruspini, 2011). Moreover, it must be considered that our sample is 
more educated than average, and a recent study by Sullivan and colleagues (2014) found 
that the positive effect over time of high education on the father’s contribution to domestic 
work and childcare is particularly strong in very low fertility countries, such as Italy. It is 
possible that our respondents, even traditional ones, show some sympathy for the female 
condition, at least when required to evaluate an abstract vignette, disregarding their own 
situation (on this point, see below). Of course, things change when the respondents look at 
their own behavior, because attitudes and behaviors do not always go hand in hand. The 
second plausible explanation for this unforeseen result could be a serious social 
desirability bias due to the growing social support for equal opportunities in Western 
countries: as men benefit from gender inequalities, even the more traditional ones need to 
show some support for gender equality in order not to appear backward. 
On closer consideration, the relevance of the equity principle, at least partly supported by 
both vignettes’ results, can be a double-edged sword for gender equality because it can 
legitimize household arrangements in which the wife is mainly devoted to the chores and 
the husband to paid work. Thus, housework division could be considered fair in the short 
run, but in the long run women’s career opportunities would be undermined and their 
accumulation of non marital-specific skills would be lowered. This is perhaps the reason 
for the rejection of the arrangement in the first vignette, where the wife is assigned most of 
the housework but less paid work.  
The effects of the institutional and cultural context in which this study is carried out need 
also attention. Italy is an interesting case because allows for a conservative test of the 
equity and gender ideology factors affecting fairness. Italy has a welfare system 
characterized in many respects by the so-called “familialism by default” (Saraceno, 2010), 
and its gender culture is still quite traditional (Lopez-Claros and Zahidi, 2005). These 
features are likely to produce greater tolerance for housework inequalities, thereby 
reducing the effects of fairness determinants, as suggested  by comparative research on 
this topic (Greenstein, 2009) as well as by findings regarding the determinants of 
housework division (Knudsen and Wærness, 2008).  For this reason, it is expected that 
what we found in Italy can be observed in similar traditional countries and, to an even 
greater extent, in more gender-equal ones. 
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Some limitations affecting this study need to be discussed and, in some cases, carefully 
considered in future research. First, the choice of using a sample of dual-earner couples 
with children might appear problematic from the point of view of estimating causal effects 
using observational data. However, our findings derive from an experimental design, 
where the random assignment of focal independent variables enables us to make correct 
causal inferences. Therefore, the sample selection is much less problematic in this case, 
since it only prevents generalization to the whole Italian population, which is not our aim 
for the reasons explained in the methodological section. Second, our sample cannot be 
considered representative of the southern areas of the country. The lack of 
representativeness of these more conservative areas probably causes a slight 
overestimation of the effects of the fairness determinants analyzed here: the traditionalism 
characterizing southern Italy is likely to lower the sense of unfairness for housework 
inequalities, thereby also reducing the effects of equity and gender ideology factors.  
Other limitations are related to the vignette method. Respondent’s evaluation of the 
fictitious situations might not correspond to their judgments of personal situations. With the 
exception of the characteristics that vary as mentioned above, the subjects presented in 
the vignette are all the same, and their circumstances are inevitably abstract to a certain 
extent. Respondents may thus be induced to apply the equality rule to the vignette’s 
context more frequently than they would do with their own personal situation. However, 
even if the nexus between vignettes and real-life situations remains not fully specified, 
there is evidence of a relation between the former and the latter (see, e.g., Horne, 2003; 
Ganong and Coleman, 2005; Ganong and Coleman, 2006). This problem has been 
already acknowledged by Bernstein and Crosby (1980), but in their view the advantages of 
the vignette method are well superior to its disadvantages. Another limitation regards the 
vignettes’ capacity to attenuate social desirability biases that affect standard survey 
questions. Despite claims in the literature (Wallander, 2009), our experience raises the 
suspicion that this capacity cannot be taken for granted: the evaluation of a vignette could 
be affected to a certain extent by the normative context in which it takes place. This fact 
should be carefully considered by future research, both in designing vignettes and in 
interpreting findings. 
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Graph 1. Average Fairness Scores by Wife’s Contributions to Paid and Unpaid Work 
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Graph 2. Average Fairness Scores by Respondents’ Attitudinal Gender Ideology and 
Vignette’s Division of Housework 
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Graph 3. Average Fairness Scores by Respondents’ Behavioral Gender Ideology and 
Vignette’s Division of Housework 
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Graph 4. Average Justifiability Scores by Respondents’ Gender, Vignette’s Gender and 
Share of Housework 
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Graph 5. Average Justifiability Scores by Respondents’ Behavioral Gender Ideology, 
Respondents’ Gender, and Vignette’s Gender 
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Graph 6. Average Justifiability Scores by Respondents’ Attitudinal Gender Ideology, 
Respondents’ Gender, and Vignette’s Gender 
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Table 1. Sample Descriptives of Final (N = 770) and Initial (N = 1656) Samples  
 
 Final sample Initial sample 
Variable M SD Range M SD 
Male 0.48 0.50 0 - 1 0.50 0.25 
Female 0.52 0.50 0 - 1 0.50 0.25 
Age 41.90 5.38 19 - 63 41.83 5.54 
Less than secondary 
educ. 
0.18 0.38 0 - 1 
0.24 0.43 
Upper secondary educ. 0.45 0.50 0 - 1 0.46 0.50 
University educ. 0.37 0.48 0 - 1 0.30 0.46 
Monthly net income 1746.37 892.83 500 - 5000 1697.41 879.37 
Weekly work hours 38.67 11.78 6 - 98 39.24 11.97 
Traditional gender 
attitudes scale 
2.52 0.77 1 - 5 2.58 0.79 
Wife's % of housework 68.50 16.32 0 - 100 69.68 15.92 
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Table 2. Analysis of Variance of Vignette 1 (N = 769): Fairness Evaluation of the Division of Housework 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Source df MS F p df MS F p df MS F p 
             
Model 15 22459.58 59.70 0.000 17 20192.76 54.77 0.000 17 20106.71 54.25 0.000 
Wife's % of housework 2 137082.84 364.38 0.000 2 138540.07 375.74 0.000 2 134547.85 362.99 0.000 
Wife's relative hours of paid 
work 2 30203.69 80.28 0.000 2 30147.03 81.76 0.000 2 30142.86 81.32 0.000 
Wife's contribution to family 
income 2 1200.45 3.19 0.042 2 1186.04 3.22 0.041 2 910.08 2.46 0.087 
Children at home 1 849.02 2.26 0.134 1 841.75 2.28 0.131 1 889.32 2.40 0.122 
Wife's % of 
housework*wife's relative 
hours of paid work 4 1250.77 3.32 0.010 4 1158.50 3.14 0.014 4 1123.59 3.03 0.017 
Wife's % of 
housework*wife's 
contribution to family income 4 24.27 0.06 0.992         
R's behavioral gender 
ideology     2 853.13 2.31 0.100     
R's behavioral gender 
ideology*share of 
housework     4 1155.56 3.13 0.014     
R's attitudinal gender 
ideology         2 1714.23 4.62 0.010 
R's attitudinal gender 
ideology*share of 
housework         4 390.51 1.05 0.379 
Residual 753 376.21   751 368.71   751 370.66   
Total 768 807.53   768 807.53   768 807.53   
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Adj R2  0.53    0.54    0.54   
Root MSE  19.40    19.20    19.20   
 
Table 3. Analysis of Variance of Vignette 2 (N = 770): Renegotiating the Division of Housework 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Source df MS F p df MS F p df MS F p df MS F p 
                 
Model 5 111.87 
21.0
0 
0.00
0 7 89.41 
17.0
2 
0.00
0 11 61.88 
11.8
8 
0.00
0 11 61.26 11.74 0.000 
Gender (who becomes 
unemployed: husband/wife) 1 138.17 
25.9
4 
0.00
0 1 146.84 
27.9
6 
0.00
0 1 144.76 
27.8
0 
0.00
0 1 132.32 25.36 0.000 
Previous share of housework 2 193.27 
36.2
9 
0.00
0 2 188.80 
35.9
5 
0.00
0 2 182.83 
35.1
1 
0.00
0 2 185.87 35.63 0.000 
Children at home 2 10.70 2.01 
0.13
5 2 10.86 2.07 
0.12
7 2 11.21 2.15 
0.11
7 2 10.71 2.05 0.129 
R's gender     1 13.63 2.60 
0.10
8 1 12.27 2.36 
0.12
5 1 14.39 2.76 0.097 
R's gender*gender (who 
becomes unemployed)     1 52.49 9.99 
0.00
2 1 52.66 
10.1
1 
0.00
2 1 53.23 10.20 0.002 
R' behavioral gender ideology         2 9.77 1.88 
0.15
4     
R's behavioral gender 
ideology*gender (who 
becomes unemployed)  
 
      2 18.04 3.46 
0.03
2     
R's attitudinal gender ideology             2 1.51 0.29 0.749 
R's attitudinal gender 
ideology*gender (who 
becomes unemployed)  
 
          2 22.15 4.25 0.015 
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Residual 
76
4 5.33   
76
2 5.25   
75
8 5.21   
75
8 5.22   
Total 
76
9 6.02   
76
9 6.02   
76
9 6.02   
76
9 6.02   
Adj R2  0.12    0.13    0.13    0.13   
Root MSE  2.31    2.29    2.28    2.28   
 
 
